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REGULATION 13D AND THE REGULATORY
PROCESS
JONATHAN R. MACEY*
JEFFRY M. NETTER**
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to its authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has promulgated Sched-
ule 13D,2 which imposes certain disclosure requirements on persons
within ten days of the date that they acquire more than five percent of the
beneficial ownership of a public company.' As this article goes to press
Congress is on the verge of reducing the threshold acquisition percentage
perhaps to two percent and shortening the window from ten days to two
or even one day. As such, it seems an appropriate time to evaluate the
welfare effects of these disclosure requirements.
Item 44 of Schedule 13D requires that five percent purchasers of a
company's stock disclose their reasons for buying the shares and any
plans or proposals they have with respect to the target. The disclosure
requirements of the Williams Act are controversial among those com-
mentators applying economic analysis to legal issues because the rules
appear to force inefficient wealth transfers from shareholders of bidding
firms to shareholders of target firms.' All sides of the debate, however,
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
** Senior Financial Economist, Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. We would like to thank Dale Oesterle and Annette Poulsen for their valuable com-
ments and helpful suggestions. The Securities and Exchange Commission as a matter of policy,
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views
expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
of the author's colleagues on the Staff of the Commission.
1. Securities Exchange Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982).
2. Securities Exchange Act, Rule 13-d, Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1, 240.13d-7 (1986).
3. Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
4. Securities Exchange Act, Schedule 13D, Item 4, 17 C.F.R. 240. Schedule 13D-101, Item 4
(1986).
5. For an earlier analysis of the disclosure requirements from a property rights perspective, see
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of
Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1978) ("the disclosure requirements of the Williams
Act... dilute the value of the property right in privately produced information"). For a particularly
critical perspective, see Carney, Toward a More Perfect Market for Corporate Control, 9 DEL J.
CORP. L. 593, 597-605 (1984).
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generally presume that the disclosure requirements in fact cause bidders
to provide shareholders with new and useful information about bidders'
intentions.6
This Article explores the economic and incentive effects of these dis-
closure requirements. After a brief introduction into the specifics of Item
4, the Article examines the effects of Item 4 under the prevailing assump-
tion that these disclosure requirements actually provide target sharehold-
ers with new and useful information about the bidding firm's plans. We
observe that under this assumption there are potentially large costs to
society from the mandated disclosures. To the extent that bidders must
turn over to target shareholders the fruits of their research and disclose
their insights as to the true value of the target firm, such bidders lose not
only their incentive to undertake such research but also their incentive to
acquire the skills necessary to locate undervalued firms. Put another
way, Schedule 13D and Item 4 disclosure requirements cause an absolute
loss of wealth by reducing bidders' incentives to make wealth enhancing
takeover bids in the first place.
Section II of the Article explores the assumption that Item 4 conveys
any information of value to shareholders. We find support for the propo-
sition that the Item 4 disclosure requirements are at least partially redun-
dant in the sense that the information disclosed is already incorporated in
the target firm's share price by the time disclosures are made. Building
on this analysis, our Article examines the likely effects of Schedule 13D
under the assumption that the information disclosed in Item 4 is, in fact,
redundant.
In Section III we conclude that, to the extent it provides new informa-
tion to the market, Item 4 will deter beneficial transactions. On the other
hand, to the extent that Item 4 disclosures are redundant, they are waste-
ful, and they exacerbate the agency cost problems facing target firm
shareholders because they provide incumbent management with a private
right of action to use against hostile bidders in corporate control con-
tests.7 And, if Item 4 is redundant, then the Schedule 13D filing require-
6. See Fischel, supra note 5, at 13 (describing the disclosure provisions as the "most objection-
able feature of the Williams Act").
7. It is not clear why target firms have standing to sue for violations of § 13(d) because argua-
bly, only shareholders are harmed by violations of the statute. Congress did not create an express
private right of action, and § 13, in contrast to § 14, does not create an express right of action.
Nonetheless, courts have held that both shareholders and targets have standing to sue to enjoin
violations of § 13(d). GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972). The Supreme Court, in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), held that
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ments-irrespective of the information contained in the filings-
themselves deter beneficial tender offers. Our analysis calls into question
the desirability of the extensive legislation affecting the market for corpo-
rate control that deters tender offers and provides incumbent manage-
ment with additional tools for resisting hostile tender offers. In our view,
management has sufficient devices, and more than sufficient incentives, to
mount resistance on its own. It is the bidders and not the targets who
may be in need of any proffered regulatory assistance.8
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND MECHANICS OF 13D
A. Legislative History
In 1968, the Williams Act added section 13(d) to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 9 The Williams Act was proposed and adopted
against the background of a changing market for corporate control, char-
acterized by a huge surge in the number of takeovers, particularly in the
form of cash tender offers.t" In 1966, the year that Senator Williams first
proposed amending the Securities Exchange Act to require substantial
disclosure, one hundred cash tender offers had been reported to the SEC.
These offers represented a twelvefold increase in only six years.11 Wil-
liams and others were skeptical that investors had enough information
about these tender offers to make prudent and profitable decisions. They
saw required disclosure prior to any cash tender offers as a means for
insuring that investors had the information necessary to evaluate a pro-
posed offer.1 2 Williams recognized, however, that requiring disclosure
for cash tender offers only would still leave investors unprotected in the
event that a bid for corporate control was made via the proxy battle.
Therefore, Williams designed the statutory scheme to require disclosure
injunctive relief is available for target firm shareholders, although the Court applied the traditional
rule of injunctions that requires plaintiffs to have suffered irreparable harm in order to prevail in the
lawsuit.
8. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981) (describing conflict of interest between shareholders
and managers of firms that are subjects of takeover attempts).
9. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending Securities Exchange Act
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
10. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
11. Id.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811; 111 CONG. REC. 28,259 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams); Cohen, A Note
on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149 (1966).
19871
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about rapid, large-scale accumulations of stock by one investor or a sin-
gle group of investors. This ostensibly was done to offer complete assur-
ance that investors would have adequate information about block
purchases of their stock, regardless of the takeover method employed.
The Act, as originally introduced in the Eighty-Ninth Congress, 13 pro-
posed to amend sections 10 and 16(a) of the Exchange Act to require
advance disclosure both of acquisitions beyond a trigger percentage of
the beneficial ownership of a company and of any cash tender offers. 14
Senator Williams, acknowledging that certain investors might acquire
large percentages of shares with no intention of using these blocks to
effect a change of control of the corporation, included two exceptions to
the advance disclosure requirements. First, if the acquisition, together
with all other acquisitions in the preceding twelve months, would not
exceed two percent of a class of securities, then no disclosure would be
required.15 Second, the SEC would have the authority to grant excep-
tions if the purchaser could satisfy the SEC that the acquisition was
made purely for investment reasons and would not "in any way change
or influence the ultimate control of the corporation." 16
Congress did not adopt this original statutory scheme. Rather, Wil-
liams was forced to reintroduce the legislation in the following Con-
gress17 and to compromise one of its key features. Instead of requiring
advance disclosure in both situations, the revised legislation required ad-
vance disclosure in the case of the cash tender offer, but not in the case of
rapid, large-scale acquisitions."'
This compromise of requiring advance disclosures only in the case of
cash tender offers grew out of criticisms made by the SEC. The SEC
took the position that requiring advance notice of a large acquisition
13. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
14. S. 2731 would have amended § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78(i)(1964) to require a notice to be sent to
the issuer and a statement filed with the Commission twenty days prior to either acquisition of
beneficial ownership of more than five percent of any class of equity securities registered under the
Exchange Act or the making of a cash tender offer which, if successful, would result in ownership of
more than five percent of such securities; it would have amended § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1964),
to require ongoing disclosure for officers, directors and beneficial owners once they acquired five
percent of a class of equity securities of a registered issuer. See 112 CONG. REc. 19,003 (1966)
(Memorandum of SEC in remarks of Senator Williams.) [hereinafter SEC Memorandum.]
15. 111 CONG. R-C. 28,259 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams).
16. Id.
17. S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
18. See 113 CONrG. REc. 854-57 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams); S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 7-11 (1967).
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would not be a sound disclosure policy because it would be impossible in
some situations and misleading in others.19 The situations the SEC iden-
tified as those that would make compliance impossible were those in
which the acquisition was involuntary, such as acquisition by inheri-
tance. The situations identified as misleading were those in which a pur-
chaser filed a disclosure statement, but then changed his or her mind
about the acquisition.2" In the later circumstance, investors might pur-
sue the wrong investment strategy because the market might have al-
ready reflected the anticipated gain or loss in the stock's price from the
effects of the transfer.
The bill that Williams finally ushered through the Senate Committee
on Banking and Commerce in the 90th Congress21 reflected the SEC's
criticisms and incorporated their suggestions thereby radically altering
the structure of the legislation as originally authored by Williams. The
new bill proposed to amend sections 13 and 14 of the Securities Ex-
change Commission Act of 1934, rather than sections 10 and 16(a).22 It
established the trigger percentage for disclosure at ten percent instead of
five percent of beneficial ownership of any class of equity securities.23
Moreover, advance disclosure, the centerpiece of Williams' original pro-
posal, was completely written out of this new bill. Disclosure for acquisi-
tions of more than ten percent of the beneficial ownership was required
within ten days after the acquisition.24 Disclosure for cash tender offers
that, if successful, would result in the purchaser owning more than ten
percent of the beneficial ownership was required simultaneously with the
offer being made public.25 Congress adopted this bill, now known as the
Williams Act.2
6
B. The Mechanics
In its current manifestation, section 13(d) requires a person who ac-
quires more than five percent of the stock of a publicly traded company
to prepare a statement containing such information as the SEC prescribes
19. SEC Memorandum, 112 CONG. REc. 19,003, 19,004 (1966).
20. Id.
21. S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
22. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967); SEC memorandum, 112 CONG. REc.
19,003, 19,006 (1966).
23. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 9-11.
26. See supra note 8.
1987]
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as "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."'27 The information required is specified in the form of Sched-
ule 13D.28 The acquiror files the statement with the SEC, and the SEC
sends it to the issuer and to the exchanges where the security is traded.2 9
The statute requires the purchaser to disclose his identity and back-
ground, the source of the funds used to make the acquisition, and any
plans or proposals to make major changes in the "business or corporate
structure" of the target firm if the purpose of the purchases is to acquire
control.3 ° Williams envisioned such extensive disclosure as the only
method by which "corporations, their shareholders and potential inves-
tors could adequately evaluate a tender offer or the possible effects of a
change in substantial shareholders. ' 31 Without this disclosure, he ar-
gued, the Act would fail to achieve its stated purposes: providing the
public "with adequate information on which to base intelligent invest-
ment decisions, thereby enhancing public confidence in the Nation's se-
curities markets and encouraging healthy growth and development of
those markets. 32
Item 4 of the Schedule 13D (the form filed to comply with section
13(d) and Rule 13d) goes a bit beyond the requirements of the statute,
adding that the purchaser "state the purpose or purposes of the acquisi-
tion of securities" and "describe any plans or proposals which the report-
ing persons may have which relate to or would result in certain"
enumerated types of changes in the management, composition, operation
and policies of the issuer.33
In addition to initial intent filing, 13D investors must file amendments
to the original Item 4 in the event that there is "any material change in
the facts set forth in prior filings" (emphasis added). In general, "mate-
rial" means that a reasonable investor would find the change important
in formulating investment plans-that is, it is a change having direct im-
plications for the market valuation of the firm's shares.
In a nutshell then, a person who buys a greater than five percent inter-
est in a company must make significant disclosures about why he made
27. Securities Exchange Act, § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). The percentage figure
was reduced from ten percent to five percent in 1970.
28. Securities Exchange Act, Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1986).
29. Securities Exchange Act, § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982).
30. Id. at § 13(d)(1)(c); 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(1)(c).
31. 111 CONG. REC. 28,259 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams).
32. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967).
33. See supra note 4.
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the purchase. Interestingly, not only the SEC but management of the
target firm has standing to sue the acquiror of its stock for filing a Sched-
ule 13D that does not truthfully indicate its plans at the time of the fil-
ing.3 4 The disclosures actually made by bidders in Item 4 filings can
generally be classified into four broad groups:
1) acquisition for investment purposes only; 2) acquisition for investment
purposes with reservation of right to increase or decrease holdings as condi-
tions change; 3) acquisition for investment purposes with a possibility of
seeking control at a later date; and 4) acquisition for control purposes.
Rule 13d, therefore, requires purchasers of stock whose holdings rise
above a threshold level to reveal certain information about their plans.35
However, purchasers sued for filing a 13D, Item 4 that does not truth-
fully reveal their plans at the time of the filing do appear to face what
appear to be draconian remedies. When a court finds a violation of Rule
13d-l, it usually orders a corrective disclosure and may enjoin the
purchase of more stock or further actions until the Schedule 13D, Item 4
filing is amended.36 In a few cases, the court has gone beyond corrective
disclosure and ordered rescission and/or a permanent injunction.
These may not always be relatively minor remedies because in the
world of tender offers a delay of only a few days resulting from an injunc-
tion is very costly and often fatal to a bid. Thus, a purchaser of five
percent of the stock in a company who is contemplating a later tender
offer for that company has a strong incentive to reveal his plans in the
13D, Item 4. A bidder who does not reveal his plans for a tender offer
faces the prospect of litigation if the bid is opposed by incumbent
management.
II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Costs and Benefits of Schedule 13D, Item 4, Assuming Non-
Redundancy
While both the SEC and the courts have continued to require full dis-
closure of all 13(d) information, there are reasons to question the benefits
of disclosing all the information required in a 13(d) filing. One of the
34. See GAF Corporation v. Milsten, 453 F.2d 709, 720-21 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson & Maho-
ney, Schedule 13D." Wild Card in the Takeover Deck, 27 Bus. LAW. 1107 (1972).
35. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 548, n.9 (1986).
36. See, eg., Kirsch Co. v. Bliss and Laughlin Industries, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (court ordered corrective disclosure and enjoined further purchase of stock until 30 days after
the correction was made).
1987]
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prime examples of potentially harmful disclosure is Item 4, requiring dis-
closure of the purpose behind all five percent stock acquisitions. Presum-
ably Congress and the SEC continue to require this disclosure because
they believe the information is valuable and non-redundant to investors.
We will consider information to be redundant if it has already been in-
corporated into the price of the stock of the firm to which it pertains at
the time of its release. In this section, we will assume that information
disclosed under Item 4 is non-redundant and discuss the benefits and
costs of Item 4 disclosure requirements to see if they are justified. In the
following section we will again examine the costs and benefits of Item 4
and Schedule 13D, presuming the information in item 4 is redundant.
1. Benefits of Item 4 Assuming Non-Redundancy
One all-encompassing argument in support of the position that Item 4
is useful to shareholders is that the capital markets themselves somehow
are "entitled" to all available information about those firms whose stock
is publicly traded. Even Boyd Jefferies, who later pled guilty to two fel-
ony counts of securities law violations-including a 13D violation, said
in an SEC Roundtable Discussion that the marketplace is entitled to in-
formation, "good, bad or indifferent."37 Presumably those who subscribe
to this view are of the opinion that the information required in Item 4
should be disclosed because it will lead to more efficient investor deci-
sions regarding capital allocation. In turn, these more efficient investor
decisions will insure that capital flows to the highest valued users.
One can also argue that the absence of the Item 4 information, on the
plans of large blockholders, could increase the likelihood of fraud in se-
curities transactions. Darby and Karni, in their classic article, argued
that incomplete information on the part of a consumer about a good's
qualities creates favorable conditions for fraud by a seller.3 8 They
showed that individual sellers of certain kinds of goods have incentives to
engage in fraud, leading to an equilibrium with a non-optimal allocation
of resources. 39 This, too, may lend support to the case for requiring
disclosure of Item 4 information.
A staunch supporter of Item 4 disclosure might even argue that this
37. Boyd L. Jefferies, S.E.C. Roundtable Market Rumors and Trading Halts, (February 19,
1986).
38. Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the OptimalAmount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67
(1973).
39. Id at 70.
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information should be disclosed because information is a public good.
For example, Professors Coffee and Easterbrook and Fischel present a
case for a federal scheme of regulation that mandates the disclosure of
certain types of information.4° They identify factors that would lead self-
interested firms to not release the socially optimal amounts of informa-
tion. In general the Easterbrook and Fischel arguments are grounded in
the public good and externality aspects of the economic theory of
information.
A public good is one for which it is costly to exclude those who have
not paid for the good from consuming it. A fireworks display is an exam-
ple of a public good produced. Free riding by people who consume a
public good but decline to pay for it, can prevent the producer of a public
good from appropriating all the benefits from its production and sale.
The resulting reduction in incentives to provide the good can lead to a
provision of less than the socially optimal level of the public good. Com-
mentators such as Coffee, Easterbrook and Fishel argue, in the case of
information such as that mandated in the federal security disclosure reg-
ulations, that if the developer of information cannot appropriate all the
benefits from the information he discovered, he will engage in less re-
search. As a consequence, not enough information will reach the mar-
ket. That is, in the absence of mandated disclosure, investment analysts
who study security investments might not develop the beneficial informa-
tion because others could appropriate the research. Not all those who
listen to E.F. Hutton, ("When E.F. Hutton talks, people listen,") are
paying for the information developed by E.F. Hutton. Federal disclosure
regulations can alleviate this problem, it is argued, by requiring the re-
lease of certain information.41
While the above arguments appear to support the position that Item 4
disclosure can be beneficial, we argue that a closer examination reveals
40. See Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70
VA. L. REv. 717 (1984). Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Inves-
tor, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 680-87 (1984).
41. Non-excludibility is only one characteristic of a public good. A pure public good also has
the property that one person's consumption will not reduce the consumption of the good by another
consumer. A good example of a pure public good is national defense. Whether a person pays for
defense or not, he receives the benefits of an existing defense force. An individual's consumption of
defense presumably does not reduce the amount of defense available for others. The problem with
public goods is that their characteristics lead a market system to provide too little of the good,
because no individual has the incentive to purchase the optimal amount of the good. He will just
wait for others to purchase the good. Therefore, an optimal solution may require a government to
tax to raise the funds for the good.
1987]
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that these benefits may be virtually non-existent and that the mandated
disclosure in Item 4 may also create substantial costs. All three of these
arguments are severely flawed in the case of Item 4 and a strong case can
be made that the disclosure requirements of Item 4 should be eliminated.
The public good argument in favor of mandated disclosure is inappli-
cable as applied to the disclosures required in Item 4 because its man-
dated disclosure increases rather then reduces free-riding. Markets fail
to provide enough output of public goods because free-riding reduces in-
centives to produce the goods. However, unlike disclosure requirements
that require firms to release firm-specific information that can be used by
investors, Schedule 13D, Item 4 requires investors to release information
they have already developed about other firms. Therefore, in the case of
Item 4, free-riding is caused by the mandated disclosure. It transforms
information developed by an acquiror into a public good. Other inves-
tors can free-ride on the research done by the filer who must reveal his
plans.
The effect of this disclosure is to reduce the incentives for investors to
make the type of investments that must be disclosed. The information of
value is the bidder's plans. The probability of the information never
coming into existence increases if bidders must disclose the information
before realizing its full profit potential. In the absence of mandated dis-
closure, the bidder's plans quickly will become known to the public
through the bidder's actions. Thus, without mandated disclosure there is
no public good problem because the economic benefits from the bidder's
information (for example, a tender offer at a price greater than the mar-
ket price) will be realized even if the information is not disclosed in ad-
vance to the market. The effects of requiring disclosure are purely
distributive. In fact, as we discuss below, beneficial tender offers may not
occur if bidders are forced to disclose their plans.
In addition, Easterbrook and Fischel, while making a case for man-
dated federal disclosure, were careful to point out, "we have not con-
structed a compelling case for regulation of any sort, let alone for the
particular regulations the SEC uses."42 Easterbrook and Fischel did not
attempt to justify regulations, such as Item 4, that impose duties on the
purchasers of stock to reveal information. The related argument, that
13D statements provide notice to competing bidders and thus begin a
competitive bidding process, is similarly flawed. While auctions may be
42. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40, at 714.
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beneficial to target firm shareholders, firms should not be compelled to
conduct an auction for the sale of their own assets any more than they
should be forbidden to do so.43
The argument about the possible increase in the incidence of fraud is
equally misguided. A large literature has discussed how market factors
constrain opportunistic behavior of which fraud is an example." For ex-
ample, Darby and Karni45 illustrated market mechanisms that deal with
the fraud problem. More importantly for our discussion, concerns about
fraud arise when the seller has special knowledge that is unknown to the
buyer at the time of purchase. We believe there is no analogous problem
when the buyer, who has developed some information about the seller's
product, exchanges a known commodity, such as cash, for the product.
Presumably, the seller could have developed this information but didn't,
and the buyer (the filer of the Schedule 13D, Item 4) should be able to
keep his information confidential. This is unlike the usual case, covered
by legal theories of fraud, where the seller has special knowledge that can
be used to defraud a buyer because there may have been no chance for
the buyer to develop the information.46
It is informative that the common law has never imposed a duty to
reveal information analogous to the disclosure requirements imposed by
13D, Item 4 on individuals who buy more than five percent of the stock
in a company. Fraud is the analogous tort. In certain circumstances
sellers, not buyers, must reveal information about the product that is be-
ing sold,47 but even sellers are not usually required to provide informa-
tion about future plans.48 Parties who have been damaged by a false
statement may also have a contract remedy for breach of warranty. But
the existence of warranties never imposes any enforceable affirmative dis-
43. Haddock, Macey and McChesney, Resistance to Tender Offers and Optimal Property Rights
in Assets, 73 VA. L. REv. 701 (1987).
44. See supra note 38.
45. See, e.g., Klein, Crawford & Alchain, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market
Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POLIT. ECON. 615 (1981).
46. There is an analogy that perhaps can be drawn to insider trading. An insider such as a
majority shareholder or a member of the board cannot buy stock from others if he has material
inside information not publically available. Of course, this is still very different from requiring all
those who purchase more than five percent of stock to reveal their purposes and plans for the stock.
47. See the discussion of fraud in W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 740 (5th ed.
1984).
48. Id. at 762.
1987]
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closure requirements on buyers.4 9
Proponents of 13D disclosure also defend such disclosure on the
ground that it provides accuracy to otherwise speculative positions in
stock. This argument neglects the fact that whatever inaccuracy exists in
the share price of a target firm reflects valuable information that can only
be discovered at considerable cost. Requiring premature disclosure of
this information deprives bidding firms of any incentive to gather this
information in the first place. Thus mandatory disclosure ultimately re-
sults in less accurate share prices for target firms as fewer bidders engage
in the search process that uncovers such information.
Finally, even if there are benefits from the disclosure mandated in Item
4, these benefits must be balanced against the costs. There are efficiency
reasons for keeping information confidential in certain situations. We
believe that hostile takeovers present one such situation. The takeover
process facilitates the movement of corporate resources to their highest
valued users. The process requires bidders to engage in a costly search
for information about potential targets.5" Requiring bidders to disclose
this information before they have realized its full value through
purchases of a target firm's stock will lead to suboptimal search levels by
bidders.
2. Costs of Item 4 if it Provides Non-Redundant Information
While the theoretical support for the existence of benefits from Item 4
disclosure is limited, the theoretical arguments that these disclosure pro-
visions impose potentially high costs on all shareholders are highly per-
suasive. Forcing potential bidders to disclose their motives for buying
shares and their plans for increasing the value of the target firm decreases
the likelihood that such value-increasing activities will occur. This is a
classic example of the free-rider problem. Specifically, this disclosure can
deter beneficial tender offers by reducing the gains to bidders from
takeovers.
Empirical evidence strongly indicates that takeovers benefit target-firm
49. IdL at 675. A buyer may find it in his interest to reveal plans for a product. But the only
duty that can arise in this situation is an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose which is
given by the seller.
50. See Fischel, supra note 5, at 16. For a discussion of the costs involved in identifying poten-
tial targets, see Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1981).
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shareholders and society as a whole.51 Grossman and Hart, among
others, have shown that if socially desirable takeovers are to exist, bid-
ders must be compensated for the costs of investigating and acquiring
potential targets. 2 Grossman and Hart demonstrated that value maxi-
mizing shareholders, who are aware of the fact that their firm is worth
more in the hands of an outside bidder, will not tender unless they are
paid a price at least equal to the value of the firm to the acquiror.53 They
based their conclusion on the assumption that each shareholder is small
enough that his tendering decision will not affect the outcome of the
tender offer. 4 Their results hold even though accepting a lower bid
would benefit target shareholders as a group. The only way around this
free-rider problem is to let the raider exclude shareholders from com-
pletely sharing in the benefits of the takeover. Therefore, mandated dis-
closure laws can have dramatic effects on the probability of takeovers
occurring and succeeding. Strict mandated disclosure laws decrease the
threat of takeover bids by reducing appropriable benefits to bidders.
The above analysis applies with equal force in the case of a raider or
pirate who plans to loot the target firm by converting its assets to his own
personal use at the expense of non-tendering shareholders. In principle,
full disclosure rules provide shareholders with information about the
looter's intentions. But, just as full disclosure may prevent higher valu-
ing users from acquiring control, it may (absent other constraints) facili-
tate the acquisition of control by looters. Shareholders who receive an
announcement that leads them to conclude a bidder is a looter unques-
tionably will be strongly inclined to sell out at the firm's current market
price in order to avoid the danger of other shareholders selling out and
being left with a minority position in a firm controlled by looters. This
will drive the price of the firm's shares down and make it less costly for a
looter to obtain control. Of course, the process also works in reverse. As
Professor Loss has succinctly put it, "one result of full disclosure may
well be: the better the reputation and attainment of the offeror, the
51. See Gregg Jurell, James Brickley, and Jeffrey Netter, "The Market for Corporate Control:
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980," Journ. of Economic Perspectives Forthcoming (1987) for an
excellent summary. Takeovers not only improve efficiency by replacing inefficient management but
also by increasing the incentives of all managements to be efficient to escape hostile takeovers.
52. Grossman & Hart, The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric In-
formation, 36 J. FIN. 253 (1981).
53. Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Law and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323 (1980).
54. Id. at 327.
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higher the price he will have to pay."55
This reasoning applies not only to looters but also to management
teams that are perceived as inferior to incumbent management. Disclo-
sure rules give these bidders an edge over bidders representing manage-
ment teams perceived as being superior to incumbent management.
Shareholders will have incentives to sell their shares (lowering share
price) if an inferior management team is in a position to obtain control in
order to avoid future capital losses from the expected poor performance
of the new management. On the other hand, shareholders will hold their
shares, hoping their value will increase, if a new highly qualified manage-
ment team may take over. Thus, it will be very costly for the new better
management to obtain control. Ironically, if shareholders behave ration-
ally, under the current disclosure regime new, poor management teams
can prevail in tender offer battles and strong, competent management
teams may be met with defeat.
Second, logic dictates that, if potential bidders are forced to disclose
their plans, the bidders are less likely to make an offer in the first place.
The problem is that the earlier a buyer's plans are disclosed, the greater
the likelihood he will lose the bid because management can enact changes
that diminish his probability of success. For example, incumbent man-
agements have implemented corporate restructuring policies as defensive
tactics in control contests. Frequently, these restructurings mimic the
policies initiated by bidders in the control contests. While the beneficial
policies that the bidder proposed are implemented in the restructurings
that occur, aggregate shareholder wealth declines because bidders, un-
able to appropriate the gains, have less incentive to research targets in the
first place. In addition, third parties, using the information discovered by
initial buyers can come in and outbid initial purchases due to the lower
costs incurred by the third parties. While the initial bidder may be able
to sell his foothold in the target at a profit under either scenario, often
this potential trading profit may not adequately compensate the first bid-
der for his research costs. The possibility of not fully recouping research
costs must diminish the number of bids made. 6 This reduction in the
likelihood of tender offers occurring can result in a significant loss to
investors.
Jarrell and Bradley found empirical support for these arguments in
55. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 580 (1983).
56. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. I
(1982).
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their study of the effects of the Williams Act and state regulation of
tender offers.5 7 They argued that these regulations, which force in-
creased disclosure and delay the execution of tender offers, have diluted
acquiring firms' property rights in information. These regulations have
caused an increase in the premiums paid in tender offers, which redis-
tributed the gains from acquirors to target firm shareholders.5" Because
acquirors receive a smaller share of the gains from takeovers, Jarrell and
Bradley argued, the regulations have reduced the number of takeovers
and reduced the social gains from takeovers. Furthermore, the gains to
bidders have been declining over this time. This evidence provides
strong support for the hypothesis that mandated disclosure deters so-
cially beneficial investments in research and beneficial takeovers.
A final problem, related to the previous one, is that, because requiring
disclosure of Item 4 reduces the likelihood of tender offers, potential bid-
ders will not monitor management's performance to the same extent as
they would otherwise. This decreased level of monitoring can allow
management to continue policies detrimental to the firm's sharehold-
ers.59 The sources of agency costs and the effect of the market for corpo-
rate control in controlling those costs have been well documented.
Mandated disclosure of Item 4, by reducing the incidence of takeovers,
permits, and perhaps encourages suboptimal performance by managers.
The higher level of agency costs permitted by Item 4 can result in lower
stock trading prices of potential targets.
In sum, it appears to us that there are potentially high costs and poten-
tially small benefits from the disclosure mandated in 13D, Item 4. We
base this analysis on the assumption that Item 4 provides non-redundant
information. In fact, as shown below, some of the information contained
in Item 4 may be redundant given the other disclosure requirements of
Schedule 13D. In the next section we examine the stock-price evidence
on the information contained in Schedule 13D's and discuss other costs
associated with its requirements.
57. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulation of Cash Tender
Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980).
58. While the premiums paid to target shareholders are higher, they receive fewer bids. Jarrell
and Bradley argued that the net effect has been a loss for target shareholders.
59. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8.
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III. REDUNDANCY AND THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ITEM 4
A. Empirical Evidence-At Least in the Case of Corporate Raiders,
Item 4 Disclosure May be Largely Redundant
The efficient capital market hypothesis posits that stock prices of pub-
lic companies at any given time "fully reflect" all publicly available infor-
mation about the firm. The efficient capital market hypothesis is widely
accepted; as Professor Jensen has observed, "[t]here is no other proposi-
tion in economics which has more empirical evidence supporting it than
the efficient market hypothesis."'  In the case of 13D disclosures, the
efficient market hypothesis can be used to draw conclusions about the
importance of disclosures by examining the magnitude of stock move-
ments at the time of the disclosures. If, after disclosure, the stock price
of the firm to which the disclosure pertains does not change, it is reason-
able to infer that the disclosure contained no new material information.
Our analysis of the stock price evidence on 13D filings suggests that, in
certain situations, the important distinction between control and passive
block formation is made largely by the market without the help of Item 4
disclosures. The evidence suggests that the market can reach conclu-
sions, based solely on its knowledge of the identity of the block purchaser
about whether such a purchaser's 13D investment is a prelude to an at-
tempt to gain control of the target firm. The purchaser's identity is an
important bit of information because active blockholder-investors such as
arbitrageurs develop bonded reputations that the market uses in predict-
ing the ultimate outcome of investment decisions. In addition, certain
other investors develop particularized expertise in decoding the signals
contained in the purchases of others. When the market learns the iden-
tity of certain filers, the available stock price evidence suggests that the
additional disclosure contained in the Item 4 disclosure documents adds
little information.
Table 1 summarizes several studies examining the stock price reaction
to 13D filings, grouping the data on the alternate bases of intent (control
or passive) and identity (raider or non-raider).6' The data indicates that
for well known corporate "raiders" intent and identity have similar stock
60. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978).
61. The stock price evidence discussed here is based on a calculation of abnormal returns (also
called excess returns or net of market returns). An abnormal return is the change in the stock price
of a firm that cannot be explained by changes in market conditions. Thus, the price change is due to
firm-specific events. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are abnormal returns summed over some
period. A further discussion of this technique is presented later in the Article.
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price effects, averaged over large samples of 13D filings, when control
intent is compared to "raider" identity, and passive intent is compared to
"non-raider" identity.
Mikkelson and Ruback provided information on the stock price reac-
tion to 13D filings, classified by the information contained in Item 4.62
They found that the valuation effects of 13D filings, in cases not associ-
ated with an outstanding takeover, depended on the investor's intent.
(Their results are listed in the Stated Intent columns in Table 1.) Mikkel-
son and Ruback calculated the abnormal returns in the two-day window
around the initial announcement of the filings. The highest returns, an
increase of 7.74%, occurred when the filer mentioned the possibility of a
takeover in the Item 4. By contrast, the abnormal returns were only
3.24% if the investor reported the purchase was for investment purposes
only. These results indicate that the market obtains valuable information
from the filings of 13D's-information that is related to the intent of the
investor.
Another issue is the ability of the market to infer intent from the dis-
closure of the fier's identity, thus reducing the importance of the specific
information in Item 4. Holderness and Sheehan performed a more direct
test of the effects of the identity of the investor in 13D filings on the price
of a target stock.63 (These results are reported in the Identity of Filer
column in Table 1.) Poulsen supported their results by subsequent re-
search. 4 Holderness and Sheehan found that for six individuals, all of
whom are commonly described as corporate "raiders", net of market
stock prices increased 5.9% in the ten-day period preceding the first pub-
lic announcement of the acquisition, while for a control sample of other
investors the net of market stock prices increased only 3.4%.65 Most
62. Mikkleson & Ruback, An Empirical Analysis of the Interfirm Equity Process, 14 J. FIN.
ECON. 523, 535 (1985).
63. Holderness & Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors, 14
J. FIN. ECON. 555, 567 (1985). The six investors Holderness and Sheehan studied were Icahn, Ja-
cobs, Lindner, Murdock, Posner, and Bludhorn. They chose these six individuals because all are
publicly viewed as raiders.
64. A. Poulsen, Market Reaction to Corporate Raiders as Individuals, (Office of the Chief
Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, Working Paper, 1984).
65. Holderness and Sheehan found that on the day of the first public announcement of stock-
holding the abnormal returns in target firms was 1.8% for the raiders' targets and .4% for the other
targets, a significant difference. Poulsen found a 6.10% abnormal return for raiders' targets in the
day (-20) to day (1) window around the filings of three raiders. The abnormal returns were even
higher for Posner and Icahn in the Poulsen sample. See Poulsen, supra note 64.
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importantly, Holderness and Sheehan found these differences (5.9% to
3.4%) to be statistically significant.
A comparison of the Mikkelson and Ruback and Holderness and
Sheehan stock-price evidence is revealing. The evidence suggests that,
while the intention of an investor is valuable information to the market,
that intent may be inferred from the revelation of the identity of the in-
vestor, particularly if the investor is a well-known raider. The 13D fil-
ings revealing a possible control intent in Item 4 have a similar impact on
stock prices as do the filings of raiders (7.74% to 5.9%), while passive
intent and non-raiders' filings also have similar stock-price effects (3.24%
to 3.4%).
One must be careful in drawing too strong a conclusion about the com-
parison of the effects of identity and intent based solely on a comparison
of these studies. Mikkelson and Ruback and Holderness and Sheehan
did not calculate abnormal returns for the same exact windows and the
studies used different samples of filers. In addition, Holderness and
Sheehan did not control for the intent stated in their sample of 13D's,
and Mikkelson and Ruback did not control for the identity of the inves-
tors. Thus, the differential stock-price effects that Holderness and
Sheehan found for raiders may occur because raiders state a control in-
tent in their Item 4's more often than other filers. On the other hand,
stock-price increases that Mikkelson and Ruback attributed to a control
intent stated in Item 4 may in fact be derived by the market simply from
the identity of the filers. Definite conclusions on the importance of Item
4, given the identity of the fier, will require further empirical work.
At least in the case of one very well-known raider-Victor Posner-we
do have direct evidence that the market can infer a probable control in-
tention from identity alone. Holderness and Sheehan found that the fil-
ing of a 13D by Victor Posner is associated with a 7.0% abnormal return
earned by holders of targets' stock. However, our own examination of
nineteen of Posner's actual initial 13D filings revealed no cases in which
the Item 4 indicates that the acquisition was part of a plan to seek control
of the company.66 In every case, the 13D filing stated that the acquisi-
tion was for investment purposes and reserved the right to increase or
decrease holdings as conditions change. "Control" was never men-
tioned.67 Therefore, at least for Posner's filings, the evidence indicates
66. Poulsen found the cumulative abnormal return in the window day (-10) to day (0) was
7.3% for the stock prices of these 19 firms. See Poulsen, supra note 64.
67. We also found that Icahn's initial 13D's rarely contained an intention to seek control.
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that the market forms its judgments about control intention from his
identity, not from its judgments about control identity, and not from the
Item 4.68
In sum, the authors believe there is evidence supporting the hypothesis
that stated intent in 13D's may be redundant in that it provides the mar-
ket with no new information beyond that which can be gleaned from
knowledge of the identity of the filers. There is an important caveat to
these results. This empirical evidence is based on the actions of well-
known raiders. Their reputation conveys valuable information. The
market may not be able to predict as easily the intent of a less well-
known purchaser simply from his identity. Thus, there may be signifi-
cant benefits to some investors from the revelations in the Item 4 filed by
an unknown investor. Of course, such purchasers will develop reputa-
tions that allow the market to predict the ultimate outcome of those ac-
quisitions if the benefits to the market of acquiring the expertise to make
these predictions come to outweigh the costs. And the ability of market
professionals to discern the intentions of a purchaser from knowledge of
his identity should not be underestimated.
In sum, we believe there is evidence that Item 4 is at least partially
redundant. The problem is that there are costs to Item 4 even when it
provides no new information. In the next section we discuss some ob-
served costs related to Item 4 disclosure. We show the effect of target
management's suits may be to reduce target shareholder wealth. In addi-
tion, because Item 4 may make a tender offer more difficult to imple-
ment, this requirement may actually deter significant stock purchases by
potential bidders.
B. Costs and Benefits of Item 4 Assuming At Least Partial
Redundancy
Assuming that at least in some cases Item 4 may provide no informa-
tion not revealed by disclosure of a bidder's identity, where does that
leave our argument on the costs and benefits of 13D, Item 4? Most im-
portantly, when Item 4 provides no additional information, our preced-
ing analysis is still valid with respect to 13D's in general because those
However, his initial filings still were associated with a price increase that indicated the market ex-
pected a control contest (7.2% abnormal return in the Holderness and Sheehan study, 12.7% abnor-
mal return in the Poulsen study).
68. An examination of the eventual outcomes of these 19 cases revealed that Posner eventually
made a tender offer in four cases, and obtained control or a seat on the board in three of these firms.
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filings require disclosure of the bidder's identity as well as his plans.
That is, if the market can infer the bidder's plans from his identity, then
all our arguments about the distinctive effects of Item 4 filings still apply
to 13D filings, although the harm comes not from disclosure of the bid-
der's plans, but from disclosure of his identity. Where disclosure of a
bidder's identity reveals the nature of his plans, inefficiencies result be-
cause investors can not appropriate all the benefits of their research. As
such, the resulting costs, discussed earlier, of deterred tender offers and
reduced checks on incumbent management will result where disclosure
of identity provides target shareholders with useful information.
L Item 4 as a Defensive Device
Ignoring those deterrence effects caused by the disclosure mandated in
Schedule 13D, costs to the Item 4 requirement still exist even if the infor-
mation it provides is redundant. Obviously, where Item 4 is purely re-
dundant, it is of no value to investors. But it is not possible to conclude
that when Item 4 is redundant it can do no harm. In addition to the
substantial direct costs of preparing the disclosure documents, we believe
the disclosure mandated in Item 4 causes inefficiencies because it gives
entrenched management an additional weapon to use against hostile
bidders.
This Article will not digress into the arguments for and against the
ability of management to use defensive tactics in general. We wish to
start our analysis, however, from two well-established premises. First,
while target shareholders may benefit from resistance, resistance to take-
overs should not be mandated. Second, to the extent that defensive tac-
tics benefit shareholders, incumbent management, who presumably wish
to keep their jobs, are perfectly capable of presenting their shareholders'
interests to the extent that resistance to a hostile bid is called for. In
short, the danger is of too much resistance, not too little.69
At first glance, it is difficult to see precisely how target management
might use the 13D disclosure requirement to further entrench itself. The
69. See Haddock, Macey and McChesney, supra note 43. There is a large literature analyzing
empirically the effects of defensive tactics by incumbent management. See, e.g., Jarrell & Poulsen,
Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, J. FIN.
ECON. (forthcoming) (authors demonstrated that some antitakeover amendments reduce target
shareholders' wealth). But see Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests
Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. L. & ECON. 151 (1985) (defensive tactics may increase shareholders'
wealth).
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direct costs that the disclosure requirements impose on raiders, such as
hiring lawyers to prepare Schedule 13D reports, appear trivial compared
to the total cost of launching a tender offer. Further, if the information is
redundant, it seems unlikely that it can benefit incumbent management.
The Item 4 disclosure requirements constitute a device used by target
management to entrench itself because it gives recalcitrant target man-
agement additional grist for the lawsuit mill. As previously discussed,
Schedule 13D requires purchasers of five percent of a corporation's com-
mon stock to disclose their intent (plans) with respect to the target cor-
poration. In addition, five-percent purchasers must amend their 13D
filings in the event there is any material change in the facts set forth in
prior filings. In our view, the vagueness inherent in defining intent pro-
vides target management with the ability to obtain preliminary injunc-
tions and temporary restraining orders under Item 4 auspices. This may
be just one of the actions filed by target management in its defense, but it
is a relatively inexpensive weapon, and it has an imprimatur of legitimacy
lacking in other defensive tactics.
2. Overview of the Item 4 Cases
In order to examine the possibility that Item 4 can be used as a defen-
sive tactic, we developed a virtually exhaustive set of reported cases in
which the 13D investor was sued over alleged violations of Item 4 disclo-
sure. In these cases the 13D, Item 4 claim was usually one of several
allegations in the suits. We examined the nature of the target manage-
ment's allegations, and the holding of the court in order to determine
management's motivations in bringing the lawsuit and as well as the ef-
fects of these suits on share prices. (Table 2 presents a summary of case
allegations and court holdings.)
First, note that forty-seven cases is a small percentage of total Item 4
filings. During 1983 alone the SEC received approximately 1700 Sched-
ule 13Ds and about 3700 amendments to Schedule 13Ds. This relatively
small number of suits suggests that there is something exceptional about
these actions. A review of the data reveals that the suits typically arise in
the context of a hostile takeover or a perceived threat of a takeover. This
is logical, considering the remedies that are available under the law.
When a violation is found, the courts commonly order corrective disclo-
sure and an injunction preventing further purchases until a corrected
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amendment is filed.7° The most severe remedy--disvestiture of stock
that is held and a permanent injunction barring further purchases-has
been granted by the courts in a few cases for deliberate violations.7
Clearly, remedies of this type are most useful as a way of combatting a
hostile tender offer. However, even a temporary injunction can be a val-
uable delaying tactic as part of a defensive strategy.72
Table 2 contains a summary of the allegations and holdings of the
cases.73 It is difficult to quantify and aggregate legal cases because they
often turn on subtle fact differences. However, this summary provides
insights into the form of these actions. In twenty-five cases, target man-
agement alleged that the bidder did not reveal his control purpose in his
disclosure documents. In eleven cases, the plaintiff alleged that there was
an insufficient statement of intent. Nine cases alleged a failure to disclose
plans to merge or liquidate the firm. Three actions were based on the
allegation of the existence of an undisclosed plan to extort an excessive
price in a subsequent share repurchase (seek greenmail). In almost every
case, the target firm was clearly concerned with a potential control battle.
This suggests that target management teams file these actions as a defen-
sive mechanism against perceived threats to their control.
Table 2 also contains a summary of the outcomes of the litigation. It
reports the holdings of the highest court that reached a decision in each
case. When the court issued a preliminary injunction or remanded the
case for a new trial, and no further action on the case was reported, the
eventual result presumably was an out-of-court settlement or an end to
the takeover attempt or both.
In twenty-nine cases, we classified the defendant as the winner. That
is, the court either found the bidder's disclosure to be adequate and re-
fused to issue an injunction or it reversed an earlier injunction and dis-
missed the action. Note that calling the defendant the winner is
somewhat misleading in this context. If the primary purpose of the tar-
get's management is to delay a potential tender offer or takeover attempt,
the target might win the war by losing the battle if the litigation involves
sufficient delay.
70. See, ag., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977).
71. General Steel Industries, Inc. v. Walco National Corp., [1981-1982] Sec.L.Rep. (CCH)
98,402 (E.D. Mo., Nov. 24, 1981).
72. See Jarrell, supra note 69. Jarrell found that management-induced delay in a tender offer
can increase the premium paid to targets.
73. Note the similarity between some of the classifications (for example, insufficient statement
of intent and control purpose not revealed).
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We classified the plaintiff as the winner in eighteen cases in our sam-
ple. In five cases, the court issued an injunction until trial and, in two
cases, remanded for a new trial. In four cases, the court issued an injunc-
tion on further purchases and/or proxy solicitations until some period
(usually thirty days) after corrective disclosure was filed. In one case, the
court issued a permanent injunction. Finally, in three actions, the court
ordered some sort of rescission.
Given the considerable carrying costs (interest costs, exposure to mar-
ket moves exacerbated by large and undiversifiable holdings) to the 13D
investor, and given the critical role played by timing in a successful con-
trol bid, such remedies can impose enormous costs on the bidding firm.
Such costs can be large enough to result in disadvantageous settlements
or withdrawal of the bid. And the prospects of defensive litigation may
deter initial bids in the first place. The costs to bidders are illustrated, in
the extreme, by the cases in which the court forced a complete or partial
rescission of the entire foothold 13D acquisition. But even if a relatively
mild form of discipline, such as corrective disclosure plus injunction
(four cases), is imposed on the defendant, there may be considerable de-
lay-related costs (such as a thirty-day purchase restriction after correc-
tive disclosure is filed).
In short, we believe the evidence demonstrates that the 13D, Item 4
requirement can be a defensive tactic, not only as a delaying device but
also as a signal that target management will resist the bidder. Defend-
ants win a significant proportion of the cases (twenty-nine of forty-seven,
or sixty-one percent). These figures could mean that in many of the cases
the bidder never contemplated anything more than an investment in the
target's stock or that a false Item 4 claim is difficult to prove. However,
in either case, Item 4 serves as a source of litigation. It is an additional
defensive tactic provided by the federal government that incumbent man-
agement does not need and target firm shareholders cannot avoid.
IV. ITEM 4: A COASIAN PERSPECTIVE
In essence, those who defend the mandatory disclosure system make a
contractarian argument. They argue that shareholders of target firms
would mandate disclosure of the kind required in Schedule 13D, but are
somehow at a disadvantage vis-i-vis purchasers that prevents them bar-
gaining effectively with purchasers. The legislative history of the statute
supports this view of the theoretical underpinnings of the disclosure re-
quirements. Congressional proponents of the statute claimed that one of
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the primary goals of the Williams Act was to place public investors "on
an equal footing" with acquirors.74 Interestingly, no one has ever ex-
plained why target firms could not themselves provide incentives for bid-
ders to disclose the information required by the Williams Act if such
disclosure would benefit shareholders. If shareholders of potential target
firms find such information of value, they could make appropriate adjust-
ments in their firms' articles of incorporation that would require the dis-
closure. Alternatively, they would seek to list their shares on stock
exchanges that required bidders to make such disclosures. If such adjust-
ments to firms' articles of incorporation prove to be too costly or too
difficult to make, we believe the law should respond by facilitating these
adjustments-not by mandating disclosure for all firms. Indeed, we be-
lieve the only plausible explanation for the nonexistence of such firm-
created disclosure requirements before the passage of the Williams Act is
that shareholders do not value them.
Certainly managers have incentives to make hostile takeovers as diffi-
cult as possible in order to retain their jobs. Thus, the absence of these
prohibitions cannot be attributed to the divergence of interests between
shareholders and managers. In other words, if disclosures by bidders
were beneficial to shareholders, target firms would require such disclo-
sures, and they did not and do not.
In our view, the reason that shareholders would not make such de-
mands on bidders is that it is not in the interest of these shareholders to
do so. Hostile bids present target shareholders with a variety of
problems, all of which are effectively handled by intrafirm contracts or
stock exchange rules. For example, coordination problems among target
shareholders are a much more severe probem for target shareholders
than lack of disclosure by potential bidders.75 It is well-known that a
two-tier bid can place target shareholders in a "prisoners' dilemma" that
leaves them subject to coercive and exploitive treatment by bidders (or by
targets in a self-tender), yet the law does nothing to protect shareholders
from this dilemma.76 Indeed, as discussed above, the Williams Act may
exacerbate the problems of coordination among target shareholders by
providing them with an incentive to tender in the face of unattractive
74. See Fischel, supra note 5, at 10.
75. See Macey & McChesney, A TheoreticalAnalysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE LJ. 13
(1985).
76. Id. See also Carney, supra note 5, at 598-600.
[Vol. 65:131
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/4
REGULATION 13D
offers, while prompting them to refuse to tender in the face of attractive
offers.
Our point here is that it is noteworthy that, prior to enactment of the
Williams Act, shareholders themselves did not indicate they were disad-
vantaged by a lack of disclosure by bidding firms. Indeed, we believe the
absence of any attempt by target firms to mandate disclosures similar to
those required by the Williams Act, through intrafirm agreements, pro-
vides strong evidence of the limited value of these disclosure require-
ments to target shareholders.
Target-firm shareholders derive tremendous benefits from an unfet-
tered market for corporate control. Widely dispersed shareholders are
ineffective monitors of the activities of the managers of the firms in which
they own shares. Such shareholders place a high value on the monitoring
that is done by potential acquirors. However, this monitoring will not
occur unless these potential acquirors are given adequate incentives to
engage in the costly search necessary to locate undervalued firms. There-
fore, target shareholders have a strong incentive to encourage such
search. And, while it has been well established that target shareholders
may want their management to engage in resistance to takeovers (follow-
ing in the Easterbrook and Fischel tradition, the term resistance here
refers to any action that makes takeovers more costly), mandatory disclo-
sure of the bidding firm's acquisition plans is not the sort of resistance
that target-firm shareholders would choose for themselves.
The literature on takeovers identifies several categories of defensive
tactics that can be beneficial to target-firm shareholders. The first cate-
gory includes those tactics identified by Professors Gilson and Bebchuk
in their well-known exchange with Professors Easterbrook and Fischel.77
Gilson and Bebchuk pointed out that target-firm shareholders often will
be better off if their managers use defensive tactics to produce a subse-
quent higher bid for their shares, through the creation of an auction mar-
ket. They argued that, while such resistance may decrease the number of
bids for targets, the resulting higher price for targets will offset these
losses to target shareholders. The disclosure mandated by the Williams
Act in Item 4 does not further the objectives envisioned by Bebchuk and
Gilson. The disclosure provisions do nothing to "buy time" for the crea-
77. See Bebchuk, Comment: The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1028 (1982); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: Reply and Exten-
sion, 35 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982).
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tion of an auction market for the target firm.7" If disclosure attracts ad-
ditional bidders, this is because these bidders are able to free-ride on the
research of the initial bidder. Ex ante this free-riding will only decrease
the probability of an initial bid being made, it will not enhance the qual-
ity of the auction market.79
Next, as Carney and Oesterle argued, 0 defensive tactics can benefit
target-firm shareholders by solving some of the game theoretic problems
associated with the two-tiered bid. As explained above, however, the dis-
closure provisions evaluated here exacerbate rather than mitigate these
problems by providing shareholders with a perverse set of incentives in
the decision to tender.
Finally, Haddock, Macey and McChesney"1 suggested that defensive
tactics provide an incentive for target firms to invest in ways that make
themselves attractive to potential bidders. Their theory is that resistance
enables target firms to reap the full value of their investment in the firm.
Firms can and should set their own levels of resistance based on their
own personalized decisions about how much monitoring by outside firms
they deem to be appropriate.
Implicit in these discussions of the value of defensive tactics is the no-
tion that both parties, targets as well as bidders, bring value to corporate
control transactions; and both parties should be protected from having
the investments they have made in the firm expropriated by outside bid-
ders without compensation. The disclosure provisions of Item 4 and
Schedule 13D specifically and the Williams Act in general are antitheti-
cal to the basic economic model of the takeover process because they
force bidders to turn over to targets the fruits of their search for informa-
tion about targets.
Simply put, target-firm shareholders are the real losers of the Williams
Act disclosure provisions discussed here. By removing bidders' incen-
78. The cause of action given by Item 4 can be used to buy time, as we discussed earlier.
However, it is ridiculous to think that Item 4 can be justified on the grounds that it bestows this
"right" on target-firm management.
79. Greenmail is an example of a defensive tactic that can facilitate the creation of an auction
market without causing a free-rider problem. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 75.
80. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case
Against Fidicuary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 341; Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiat-
ing Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L,
REV. 53 (1985).
81. Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Resistance to Tender Offers and Optimal Property Rights
in Assets, supra note 43.
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tives to search, the disclosure provisions lower the probability that tar-
get-firm shareholders will enjoy the gains from trade that can come from
hostile takeovers.82
Indeed, regardless of the source of the bidders' information, if that
information is not already reflected in the target firm's share price, there
will be gains from trade, L e. gains for both bidders and targets, if bidders
can trade on the basis of that information without disclosing it. Where
disclosure is required there will be fewer mutually beneficial bargains be-
tween bidders and targets at the margin, although they will not disappear
entirely. And, unlike other defensive tactics, the reduction in offers
brought about by required disclosure will not bring a concomitant in-
crease in the premium to targets because any increased premium will not
flow to those who have brought increased value to the transaction.
In sum, in our view the old adage that the securities laws' disclosure
requirements are justified because they place target-firm shareholders on
an equal footing with bidders is misguided for two reasons. First, if tar-
get-firm shareholders desired to be placed on an equal footing with bid-
ders, they could arrange this themselves by drafting the appropriate
intrafirm agreement. Second, where privately negotiated defensive tac-
tics benefit target-firm shareholders, they do so because they apportion
the gains from trade in a takeover on the basis of the relative contribu-
tions of the parties. We argue that the rules regarding mandatory disclo-
sure of proprietary bidder information are in stark contrast with this
model in that they require the party who has created a valuable asset-
information-to turn over this asset to others.
V. THE SOURCES OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES
Thus far we have made the case that the federal rules requiring
mandatory disclosure of a bidder's plans regarding its purchase of a sub-
stantial block of another firm's shares do not benefit the group they os-
tensibly were designed to benefit. If we are correct in our theoretical and
empirical analysis, one must conjecture about why the rules were devel-
oped and why they have exhibited such excellent survival properties over
time. In the absence of a plausible public-interest explanation, we believe
the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that the mandatory disclo-
82. Society as a whole also loses when combinations that would improve efficiency never take
place or are delayed. See Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers? 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1984).
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sure components of the federal takeover laws are designed to benefit one
or more discrete interest groups rather than the public at large. As
Henry Manne,13 George Benston,"4 and Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fis-
chels5 have pointed out, law and accounting firms and investment bank-
ers are clear beneficiaries of mandatory disclosure rules, and such groups
"would suffer windfall losses if the regulations were repealed." '8 6 Some
commentators have also pointed to the SEC's interest in having regula-
tions to implement and enforce. 87
In addition to these groups, as Roberta Romano recently has demon-
strated in the context of state anti-takeover statutes, the incumbent man-
agements of firms that have a high probability of being displaced in a
takeover have a strong incentive to press for the enactment of laws im-
peding the takeover process.88 Indeed, Professor Romano observed that
states often pass anti-takeover statutes "at the behest of the local business
community, and quite frequently, one concerned firm." 9
It appears likely to us that narrow interest-group concerns also moti-
vated the legislative process that produced the disclosure rules. On the
basis of the data presented here, the relevant interest groups include not
only the incumbent management of firms that are likely takeover targets
but also the lawyers, investment bankers and accountants who enjoy in-
creased demand for their services as a result of the disclosure rules. We
base this conclusion on the fact that much of the information contained
83. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL
STREET IN TRANSITION 23, 31-40 (H. Manne & E. Solomon eds. 1974).
84. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
85. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40 at 671.
86. Id.
87. Sappideen, Takeover Bids and Target Shareholder Protection: The Regulatory Framework
in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia, 8 J. Comp. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 281 (1986)
summarizes H. Kripke's arguments in THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 317 (1979):
Because the SEC is dominated "by lawyers to the exclusion of economic thinkers", it
"shows a tendency to treat disclosure as a moral issue" rather than a pragmatic one. Id. at
18. For this reason, Kripke notes, there has been a marked tendency for the SEC to adopt
voluminous and detailed regulations with little regard for their impact upon the regulated.
The SEC has also overstretched its actual powers and is obscessed with punishment. He
questions whether the elaborate mandatory disclosure requirements continue to be neces-
sary in the face of natural forces within the capital markets (which protect sophisticated
investors) and the efficient markets theory (which protects unsophisticated investors).
88. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
89. Id. A good example is the Ohio antitakeover law passed to aid Goodyear in its battle
against Goldsmith. See Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission,
"Shareholder Wealth Effects of Ohio Legislation Affecting Takeovers." May 18, 1987.
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in the lengthy disclosure documents required by the Williams Act is
made redundant by the efficiency of the market.
VI. CONCLUSION
It would be remarkable if social product could be increased by weak-
ening the well-defined property rights of target-firm shareholders that ex-
isted before the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Williams Act.
This Article has provided an empirical and theoretical analysis of the
centerpiece of the disclosure rules applied to takeovers, which require
that purchasers reveal their future plans regarding the firms whose shares
they are acquiring.
We have concluded that if Item 4 provides useful information, it is
harmful because it deters beneficial takeovers. The deterrence comes
from several sources. Potential bidders have less incentive to engage in
costly research of potential targets because the bidders cannot appropri-
ate all the benefits of their research. Further, target shareholders are
given the perverse incentive to tender to undesirable bidders and not
tender to quality bidders. Thus, it may be easier for a looter or other
undesirable bidder to take over a firm than a bidder who could improve
the firm's operations.
We also present evidence that suggests that, in certain cases, the infor-
mation revealed in Item 4 is redundant. In many cases, the market can
infer the plans of the bidder from his identity. However, if Item 4 is
redundant, the Schedule 13D filing itself deters beneficial takeovers. We
suggest that the private right of action granted to target management
based on an allegedly false Item 4 serves as a weapon against a hostile
bidder. Schedule 13D and Item 4 merely exacerbate the well-known
agency accompanying the separation of ownership and management
within the large corporate enterprise.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we believe Congress could benefit in-
vestors by amending the Williams Act to remove the requirements im-
posed on block purchasers to disclose their plans regarding the target
firm. Unfortunately, the political reality is that such an amendment of
disclosure regulations will become more rather than less restrictive.
As we have seen, so long as the bidder is required to disclose his iden-
tity, the market may receive all of the information that Item 4 requires
purchasers to disclose. As such, the requirement that a bidder disclose
his identity also involves a deprivation of a valuable property right be-
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longing to the bidding firm. This deprivation is a cost to shareholders of
both potential targets and potential bidders. The main beneficiaries of
the rules are incumbent management teams and the lawyers, accountants
and investment bankers who have a comparative advantage in dealing
with and providing the complex regulatory apparatus.
TABLE 1:
ABNORMAL RETURNS TO TARGET FIRMS IN REACTION
TO 13D FILINGS CLASSIFIED BY INTENT IN ITEM 4 OR
IDENTITY OF FILER
SHARE PRICE REACTION
STATED INTENT IN IDENTITY OF FILER
ITEM 4
Control Passive Raider Non-Raider Posner
7.74% 3.24% 5.9% 3.4% 7.0%
(12.8)* (12.3)* (5.2)* (3.8)* (3.8)*
t-statistics are in parentheses, *denotes significant at the 99% level.
Sources: Results on stated intent are from Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 61, and are based
upon 26 "control" cases and 106 "passive" cases. Results on identity are from
Holderness and Sheehan, "Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial
Investors," 14 J. FIN. ECON. 523 (1985). The latter results are supported by A.
Poulsen, "Market Reaction to "Corporate Raiders", Working Paper, Office of the
Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1984.
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TABLE 2:
ALLEGATIONS AND HOLDINGS IN CASES WITH ALLEGED
FALSE SCHEDULE 13D ITEM 4 FILINGS
Primary Allegation Number*
Insufficient or Misstatement Statement of Intent, Purpose, or 11
Plans
Control Purpose Not Revealed 25
Failure to Disclose Plans to Liquidate, Merge, or Sell Assets 9
Undisclosed Plan to Extort Excessive Price for Share 3
Repurchase
Other 1
Holdings and Remedies Number
Defendant Wins 29
Plaintiff Wins 18
Injunction until Trial 5
New Trial 2
Corrective Disclosure + Injunction 4
Permanent Injunction 1
Rescission or Offer of Rescission 3
Defense Motion to Dismiss Denied 2
Correct 13D 1
* includes two cases counted in each of two categories of allegations
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